Mishpatim 5775:         The Rest is Commentary

By Rabbi Joshua (exegetically known as The Hoffer) Hoffman

The Ramban, in the beginning of his commentary to Pashas Mishpatim, says that the laws presented in this parsha are a commentary to the Decalogue, as recorded in Parshas Yisro. As an example, he says that the corpus of civil laws in the parsha are a commentary to the last prohibition of the Decalogue, not to covet the possessions of another.  Without a system of civil law, a person cannot know what is rightfully his, and what is not, so that he can properly observe this commandment. This comment of the Ramban, as we will see, has wider implications than is immediately obvious.

Rabbi Mordechai Katz, in his Ma’amar Mechokek, notes the importance of the rabbis’ statement, as brought by Rashi in the beginning of Parshas Mishpatim that just as the mitzvos in Parshas Yisro were given at Sinai, so, too, were the mitzvos in Parshas Mishpatim given at Sinai. Even though one would think that the human intellect can, on its own, prescribe such laws, for them to be truly just, they must be given by God. Only God, the Creator of the universe, understands objectively the depths of the human personality, in a thorough way, and the extent of man’s responsibility to others. In essence, the laws between man and his fellow man are rooted in the relationship between man and God, in the sense that man must recognize that all men are created in the image of God, and, as such, must be treated in a fitting manner. This is the meaning behind Hillel’s response to the potential convert who asked him to teach him the entire Torah on one foot, that is, in one principle. Hillel responded, “That which is hateful to you, do not do to others.” While this answer, ostensibly, covers only mitzvos between man and his fellow man, those mitzvos, are, in fact, rooted in the mitzvos between man and God, and, thus, the principle is all inclusive.

An interesting case in point is the very commandment we have been discussing, the prohibition of coveting another’s possessions. Rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezra, in his commentary to that mitzvah in Parshas Yisro, asks, how can one refrain from coveting something?  If he has an emotion, if he wants something, how can he be expected to control his feelings?  He answers with a parable to a simple villager who is attracted to the daughter of the king. He knows that it is beyond the reach of possibility for him to ever win her hand, and, so, any such thoughts are banned from his mind. This, says the Ibn Ezra, is how a person should feel in regard to any prohibition of God – it is beyond his realm of possibility to violate it. God, as the author of human nature, understands that makeup, and knows that man is, in fact, capable of controlling his emotions in this way and, therefore, is held accountable to do so. This insight carries over into other mitzvos as well, as we will demonstrate.

Among the laws in Parshas Mishpatim we find “Perhaps you will see the donkey of someone you hate lying under its burden; will you refrain from helping him? You shall surely help along with him” (Shemos 23:5). The Targum Yonason ben Uziel, following the Talmud (Pesochim 113b), says that the person who is being hated is one whom it is permissible, or even mandated, to hate, because of sins that he has done. Still, the Targum says that one must set aside those feelings and help that person relieve his donkey of its burden. Rav Henoch Leibowitz, in his Chidushei HaLeiv, explains that this mitzvah mandates an act of chesed, and chesed, to be done properly, must be done whole-heartedly. Even though the feelings of hatred one has towards this sinner are legitimate, and even salutary, at the moment when he does chesed toward him in relation to his property, he must put those feelings aside. The Torah recognizes his ability, and, therefore, responsibility, to do so, just as it does in relation to the prohibition of coveting, as explained by the Ibn Ezra.