Netvort Korach 5773:  Feeling Blue

By Rabbi Joshua (colorfully known as The Hoffer) Hoffman

The Midrash Tanchuma, as cited by Rashi in our Sedrah, tells that Korach, in challenging Moshe’s leadership, gathered two hundred fifty heads of Sanhedrin and clothed them in garments made entirely of techeiles, or blue-purple dyed cloth, and appeared before Moshe. They asked him if a garment that is dyed completely with techeiles is obligated in tzitzis, which requires a strand dyed with techeiles to be attached to its corner. Moshe replied that it is obligated, and they began to laugh at him. Is it possible, they said, that a cloth of a different color is exempted through one strand of techeiles, while a cloak dyed completely with techeiles needs an additional strand to exempt it? Rabbeinu Bachya explains that Korach’s group was arguing that the people did not need a leader since, as Korach said, they were all holy. Rabbi Shmuel Bornstein, in his Shem MiShemuel, asks why Korach’s argument, as voiced by his people, was made from the strand of techeiles, when it could equally have been made from the need to have three white strings hung from a garment which is totally white. Why the focus on techeiles? 

Rabbi Bornstein answers that Korach’s challenge of Moshe was directed to the need to learn the interpretation of the written Torah on the basis of the oral Torah as given over to Moshe. The oral law, he says, is represented by the techeiles, while the written law, which was challenged by the spies, is represented by the white strands. Since Korach was challenging the foundation of the oral law, he made his argument from the strand of techeiles. 

Rav Moshe Feinstein, zt”l, in his Darash Moshe, while not asking Rabbi Bornstein’s question, offers two explanations of Korach’s argument which, in effect, explains why it was specifically the techeiles strand that Korach mentioned. He says, first, that the argument from techeiles was informed by the teaching of Rabbi Meir (Menachos 43b) that the color of techeiles resembles that of the sea, which resembles the sky, which, in turn, resembles God’s throne of glory. If one strand of techeiles, argued Korach, evokes this image, then certainly a garment dyed completely with techeiles should do so, and not require an additional such strand hanging from its corner. The limitation of this approach, however, says Rav Moshe, is that it derives from a usual stimulus, rather than from an in-depth study of the Torah, and therefore, in itself, does not lead to a further development of one’s belief. We may add that Korach’s rejection of Moshe’s teachings of the oral law interpreting the written law represents a refusal to develop one’s thinking, and reflects the true nature of a “ba’al machlokes,” or fermenter of dissention.  The Maharal, in his Gur Aryeh to Rashi on Bamidbar 16:27, notes that what typifies a ba’al machlokes according to the rabbis is setting oneself to the strict law. Convinced of his righteousness, the ba’al machlokes takes an uncompromising approach and allows no room for discussion (see Aviva Zornberg’s article “From Another Shore: Moses and Korach” in the recently published volume, Radical Responsibility: Celebrating the Thought of Chief Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks, pg. 230-231, for further discussion of this Maharal). Thus, it was specifically from the techeiles, with its evocation of the Divine throne of glory, that Korach argued against Moshe’s leadership. 

Rav Moshe, in his second explanation of Korach’s argument from techeiles, says that, following Rav Meir’s teaching about techeiles resembling the sea, the sky, and the Divine throne, Korach maintained that this imagery could be derived from a garment of techeiles at least as well as it could be derived from a single thread of same. The problem here, however, is that Korach was thereby determining the Halacha based on the reason behind the mitzvah, which is not a valid enterprise. All of the reasons offered in Rishonim for certain mitzvos, and even those stated explicitly in the Talmud, which are definitely true, cannot change or shape the halacha, which is, in essence, a Divine decree, which we cannot fully understand. This theme is elaborated upon by Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik, zt”l, in his essay on the Korach rebellion, which most recently appeared in his posthumous published work, Vision and Leadership. Korach, he said, argued that techeiles, since it is meant to conjure up the mysterious link between the blue sea, blue sky, and beyond, could do this through a garment dyed completely in techeiles, as well, and such a garment, it would follow, would not require a strand of techeiles on its corner.  This, says Rav Soloveitchik, constitutes a common sense approach to Halacha. However, he says, while there is a subjective element in regard to the fulfillment of mitzvos, the guiding element in determining the Halacha must be the objective aspect derived from an in-depth study of Torah. If the common sense, subjective element is the guiding principle, everyone will determine the Halacha based on his own reasoning, and multiple practices will result.  Moreover, one can never know if his subjective feelings are genuinely religious, or purely secular, or even idolatrous. Pagan religions are, in fact, suffused with emotional frenzy, but they do not reflect holiness. Only through an objective study of Torah, as taught by Moshe and his successors, can authentic religious practice and emotions be achieved. Korach, by rejecting this approach, revealed the emptiness of his claim for the holy nature of his enterprise, which he argued based on the image of the strand of techeiles.